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A Family of Trusted Third Party Based
Fair-Exchange Protocols
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Abstract—Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas such as e-commerce where protocol participants
require mutual guarantees that a transaction involving exchange of items has taken place in a specific manner. A protocol is fair if no
protocol participant can gain any advantage over an honest participant by misbehaving. In addition, such a protocol is fault-tolerant if
the protocol can ensure that an honest participant does not suffer any loss of fairness despite any failures of the participant’s node.
This paper presents a family of fair exchange protocols for two participants which make use of the presence of a trusted third party,
under a variety of assumptions concerning participant misbehavior, message delays, and node reliability. The development is
systematic, beginning with the strongest set of the assumptions and gradually weakening the assumptions to the weakest set. The
resulting protocol family exposes the impact of a given set of assumptions on solving the problem of fair exchange. Specifically, it
highlights the relationships that exist between fairness and assumptions on the nature of participant misbehavior, communication
delays, and node crashes. The paper also shows that the restrictions assumed on a dishonest participant’s misbehavior can be
realized through the use of smartcards and smartcard-based protocols.
Index Terms—Fair exchange, security, Trusted Third Party (TTP), smartcards, crash tolerance, distributed systems.

1 INTRODUCTION
FAIR exchange protocols play an important role inapplication areas where protocol participants require
mutual guarantees that an exchange of data items has taken
place in a specific manner. An exchange is fair if a dishonest
participant cannot gain any advantage over honest partici-
pants by misbehaving. Practical schemes for fair exchange
require a trusted party that essentially plays the role of a
notary in the paper based schemes. (Gradual Exchange
protocols [6] which do not need a trusted party have high
communication overhead.) Two-participant, fair-exchange
protocols that make use of a trusted third party have been
studied in the literature (e.g., [1], [4], [13], [25]); these
protocols maintain fairness even if the dishonest participant
can tamper with the protocol execution in an unrestricted
(malicious) manner. They, however, require that an honest
participant’s node execute the protocol correctly—suffering
no failures. In other words, fault-tolerant fair exchange
protocols have not been studied adequately. A fair
exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of
fairness to an honest participant even if the participant’s
node experiences failures of the assumed type.
In this paper, we develop a number of fair exchange
protocols under a variety of assumptions concerning user
misbehavior, communication delays, and node failures.
Our development is systematic: We begin by classifying
dishonest participants into restricted abusers (they cannot
tamper with the protocol execution in an arbitrary
manner) and unrestricted or malicious abusers and the
communication model into synchronous, where a known
bound on message delays exists, and asynchronous; we
develop the very first protocol under the most constrained
set of assumptions: restricted abuser, synchronous com-
munication, and no fault tolerance. We then relax the
restricted abuser assumption to malicious abuser and then
the synchrony assumption into asynchrony. The resulting
family of non-fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols is then
transformed into a family of crash-tolerant protocols.
A major contribution of this paper is to highlight the
relationships that exist between fairness and the assump-
tions concerning abuse restriction, communication delays,
and node reliability. This enables a reader to gain a deeper
understanding of the impact that a given set of assumptions
has on solving the fair-exchange problem. Such an under-
standing simplifies deriving a protocol for one set of
assumptions from those developed with different sets of
assumptions. This paper is a revised and extended version
of [10] which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only
paper that comprehensively studied the relationships
between such diverse combinations of assumptions and
the fair-exchange protocols. The second significant con-
tribution is the development of a restricted abuse model
and a realization of that model by making use of smartcard
technology.
Several useful observations are made by comparing our
protocols with the related ones in the literature. For
example, we note that the use of optimistic message logging
for crash tolerance is more subtle than that suggested in
[16]—the first paper to consider fair-exchange with fault
tolerance. Further, contract-signing protocols are observed
to transform easily into fair-exchange protocols under our
restricted abuse model. This means that many contract-
signing protocols presented in the literature (e.g., [2], [14])
can be used to derive fair-exchange protocols for different
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sets of assumptions. These observations constitute the third
and final contribution.
The paper is organized as follows: We first describe the
problem of fair-exchange in detail and the underlying
system models (Section 2) and then develop a family of non-
fault-tolerant protocols (Section 3), followed by their crash-
tolerant counterparts (Section 4). In Section 5, we describe
the use of smartcards in realizing the restricted abuser
model defined in Section 2. Section 6 surveys the literature
for related and similar work and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 SYSTEM MODELS AND THE PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION
We consider two mutually untrusting users, UA and UB,
who have data items IA and IB, respectively, which the
other user cannot generate autonomously. User Ux,
X 2 fA;Bg, advertises that IX meets specification X and
offers to send Ix in return for receiving IY, where Y 2 fA;Bg
and Y 6¼ X. Px denotes the process that executes an
exchange protocol on behalf of user Ux on node Nx. Our
distributed exchange system (Fig. 1) has a third node
hosting the trusted third party (TTP) process. The TTP is
assumed to be reliable and secure against intrusions and
Trojan horse attacks, and is also trusted by both the users.
The exchange preserves fairness as well as nonrepudiation.
(These properties will be precisely defined shortly.)
2.1 Classifying User Misbehavior
Generally, the problem of fair exchange is solved in a
context where a dishonest user Ux totally controls the
behavior of PX to undermine every attempt to ensure
fairness and nonrepudiation. We term those dishonest users
malicious abusers and distinguish such users from a class of
restricted abusers defined below.
2.1.1 Restricted Abuser
A dishonest user UX is a restricted abuser if
1. PX can execute a piece of code X which will remain
obfuscated to UX before, during, and after the
execution.
2. UX can interfere with an execution of X only by
crashing the execution platform or by delaying,
blocking or tampering with any message which the
execution of X outputs or is destined to receive.
Suppose, for example, that user UB is a restricted abuser
and B contains some secret encryption keys and some
input-verification procedures. By the definition above, UB
cannot obtain the encryption keys in B at any time (due to
1 above) nor can a modification of B by UB result in an
incorrect input data being verified to be correct (due to 2
above).
We note that code obfuscation, used in software water-
marking and tamper-proofing (see [9] for a survey), cannot
be guaranteed to be totally secure [7]: There exists a nonzero
probability that an obfuscated program ceases to be a
virtual black box to an abuser. Therefore, realizing the
restricted-abuse model requires that PX receive X from the
TTP via a secure channel and have it executed in a tamper-
proof execution platform. In Section 5, we describe how
smartcards can be used to meet these requirements. We also
observe here that there is much interest in developing
tamper-proof computing subsystems by the industry-led
Trusted Computing Group [22]. So, it is of practical interest
to develop fair-exchange protocols under the restricted
abuse model and to thereby expose any benefits which the
model has to offer.
2.2 Classifying Communication Delays
Interprocess communication is assumed to be resilient to
network failures and intrusions. This, in turn, assumes that
any message corruption is detected using encryption and
reduced to a message loss and that message losses are
tolerated by a bounded number of retransmissions.
Note that a network intruder is here assumed to be a
restricted abuser: A message in transit is a black box to him;
he cannot modify it and have it undetected at the
destination. He can at best block a given transmission or
prevent it from being accepted at the destination. We
consider two types of network intrusions: The intruder
gives up delaying a given message transmission after a
known period of time or after some unknown time, leading
to two models: In the synchronous model, correct processes
exchange messages with delays bounded by a known D; in
the asynchronous model, D is unknown (but finite).
2.3 Classifying Node Behavior
A fair-exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures
fairness and nonrepudiation to an honest participant
despite the possibility that the participant’s node can suffer
failures of the assumed type. In other words, guarantees
afforded to an honest user do not change when his node is
unreliable. We consider two types of behavior for user
nodes:
. Reliable: An honest user’s node does not fail.
. Crash-recovery: An honest user’s node fails by
stopping to function (crash), it does resume func-
tioning (recover) after some finite (but unknown)
amount of time following a crash, it may repeat this
crash-recovery behavior at arbitrary time intervals,
for an arbitrary number of times. An honest user’s
node has access to a stable store whose contents
survive the node crash.
The traditional view taken in the TTP-based protocols
(e.g., [1], [2], [4], [17], [25]) is that the user nodes are reliable;
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Fig. 1. The two-user, fair-exchange system.
the cause of any node crash is attributed to the user who is
seen to have misbehaved and is therefore not entitled to any
fair-exchange guarantee. We classify such protocols as non-
fault-tolerant (see also [16]). Note that, whether the protocol
is crash-tolerant or not, the TTP is (assumed to be) reliable
and secure.
2.4 Properties of a Fair Exchange Protocol
A user is honest if he makes no attempt to modify the
behavior of a protocol process except through the permitted
operations.
Termination: An execution of the protocol terminates for
an honest user UX. Termination for an honest UX can be
either
. a normal termination in which PX delivers IY to UX
and the delivered IY meets Y or
. an exceptional termination where PX informs UX that
the exchange attempt is unsuccessful.
Fairness: If PX of honest UX terminates normally and if
UY is honest, UY also terminates normally. If PX of honest
UX terminates exceptionally, UY—honest or not—cannot
receive IX.
When both the users are honest, both are guaranteed to
have the same type of termination. (This property is
referred to as the goods atomicity in [21].) If only one user
is honest and if he has exceptional termination, then the
dishonest user cannot receive the expected item.
Nonrepudiation: When PX delivers IY to honest UX, it also
provides irrefutable evidence that IY was sent by UY.
Nontriviality: When both UA and UB are honest, they are
guaranteed to have normal termination provided that
certain specified conditions hold.
Without nontriviality, the other properties are trivially
met if PA and PB always terminate exceptionally. Since
nontriviality is defined only when both the users are honest,
guaranteeing it cannot be directly affected by the abuse
model considered, but only by the assumptions chosen
regarding the other two aspects. It turns out that, when the
communication is synchronous and the nodes are reliable,
nontriviality is unconditionally guaranteed; for all other
combinations of assumptions, as we explain below, some
specific sets of conditions need to be satisfied.
In the crash-recovery model, the bound on the time taken
by an honest user node to recover from a crash is unknown
and a dishonest user may never allow his node to recover.
Consider an honest user or the TTP that is waiting too long
for a message from a user process. It cannot resolve whether
the source process is honest and the message is delayed due
to a crash or is dishonest and is never going to transmit the
expected message. Similarly, in the asynchronous model, it
cannot resolve whether the user process from whom a
message is expected is honest and its message is still in
transit or is dishonest and the message will not be
transmitted at all. (Similar arguments give rise to the well-
known FLP impossibility result [12].) Therefore, meeting
the termination property would mean that a protocol
execution may have to be terminated exceptionally even if
both the users are honest. So, the necessary condition for
nontriviality is that the honest users reexecute the protocol
after every exceptional termination. If each execution is
termed an attempt, an honest user must be prepared to make
as many attempts as necessary until he has normal
termination.
The sufficient condition for nontriviality varies with the
chosen combination of assumptions: there must be an
exchange attempt in which 1) user nodes do not crash, for
the combination of synchronous communication and crash-
recovery nodes, 2) message delays do not increase during
the protocol execution, for the combination of asynchronous
communication and reliable nodes; and, 1) and 2), for the
combination of asynchronous communication and crash-
recovery nodes.
2.5 Assumptions, Notations, and the Exchange
Preliminaries
In all our protocols, the TTP sets up the context and initiates
the exchange. Consequently, the protocols are structured
into two phases: start-up phase (nearly common to all
protocols) and exchange phase (specific to the selected
combination of assumptions). It is assumed that:
. A1: Processing within functioning nodes is synchronous.
Delays for task scheduling and processing are
bounded by a known constant, which, for simplicity,
is taken to be zero in relation to communication
delays; when a protocol instruction involves com-
putationally intensive operations (e.g., taking a
checkpoint), the execution delay is assumed to be
counted in the communication delay estimates.
. A2: Clocks of functioning nodes are perfectly synchro-
nized. The clocks of the TTP and the functioning
nodes of honest users are synchronized to real-time
within a known bound, which, for simplicity, is
assumed to be zero. A recovering node receives the
current time from its user.
2.5.1 Notations
The following notations are frequently used in the paper.
. VA: Procedure to verify whether IA satisfies its
description A advertised by UA. Similarly, VB is the
procedure to verify whether IB satisfies its descrip-
tion B advertised by UB.
. M: A message; eK(M): encryption of M using key K.
. SigXðMÞ: Signature of PX, X 2 fA;Bg, on M using the
private key of UX; SigTTPðMÞ: TTP’s signature on M.
Signatures are both signer and content-dependent
and are verifiable using the signer’s public key.
. L: A label that uniquely identifies the exchanging of
IA and IB.
. N: A large random number (nonce) generated
securely by the TTP to uniquely identify messages
of a given attempt.
. H: One-way and collision-resistant hash function: It
is not feasible to compute from H(N), N, nor another
N0 such that HðNÞ ¼ HðN0Þ. H(N) is smaller in size
compared to N and is therefore used in place of N
when the latter needs to be included in a message.
. x: Contents of a message sent by the TTP to Px to
initiate the exchange phase.
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When a party Z 2 fA;B;TTPg sends a message M, it also
includes SigZðMÞ as the evidence of origin for M. A recipient
accepts a received M only if the accompanying SigZðMÞ is
found authentic and if the contents of M have been formed
as per the protocol-specific conditions. While the latter will
be stated clearly, the verification details are not made
explicit in our presentations for reasons of brevity. Thus, a
received message will refer, from now on, only to a message
received with an authentic evidence of origin and with
appropriate contents, not to the one that was received and
found inappropriate or not authentic. Further, the pair
fM; SigZðMÞg is simply written as M, which will be indicated
by its significant fields. Finally, sending of a messageM, say,
by PA to PB, will be denoted as: PA ! PB : M.
2.5.2 Exchange Preliminaries—The Start-Up Phase
The start-up phase has two subphases, each containing two
steps.
Step 0.1. Users decide between themselves the relinquish
time TR. This is the time by which they hope to complete the
exchange and the TTP is instructed not to keep the
exchange-related state information after TR. They inform
the TTP of TR and, in return, obtain label L and
SigTTPðA;B;L;TRÞ from the TTP. Using the ! notation,
Step 0.1 can be expressed as:
TTP! UA : fA;B;L;TRg;
TTP! UB : fA;B;L;TRg;
Step 0.2. Each UX approaches a trusted authority TAX to
generate a verification procedure using which any party can
verify if IX satisfies the advertised specification X. For
example, if IB is a piece of software S, TAB is a software
licensing authority (trusted by UA) who evaluates S against
the specification B. If satisfied, TAB computes an evidence
of evaluation EB ¼ HðSÞ; VB is then generated as a program
which contains EB and evaluates the predicate EB ¼ HðIÞ
when invoked to verify a data item I. Similarly, if IA is an
electronic cheque, VA should similarly be generated by a
Bank for the amount specified in A. Thus, the step
involves:
UA ! TAA : ðIA;A;A;B;L;TR;TTP; SigTTPðA;B;L;TRÞÞ;
TAA ! UA : fVA;A;TTP;L;TRg;
UB ! TAB : ðIB;B;A;B;L;TR;TTP; SigTTPðA;B;L;TRÞÞ;
TAB ! UB : fVB;B;TTP;L;TRg;
Remarks. TAA and TAB also retain the information they
receive until time TR. Note that there is no implication that
TAA and TAB are the same as the TTP itself. Imposing such
a requirement would mean that the functionality of the TTP
is quite diverse.
Steps 0.1 and 0.2 need to be reexecuted for a new, agreed
value for TR if all exchange attempts made before TR
terminate exceptionally and if users still want to continue
trying. They need not be executed during the second and
subsequent exchange attempts before a given TR. Every
exchange attempt involves executing Steps 1.1 and 1.2
described below.
Step 1.1. Users first decide between themselves on a
(future) time TEX for the TTP to initiate the exchange phase.
They then exchange what they received from their
respective TA and TEX:
UA!UB :fVA;A;TTP;L; SigTA AðVA;A;TTP;L;TRÞ;TEXg;
UB!UA :fVB;B;TTP;L; SigTA BðVB;B;TTP;L;TRÞ;TEXg:
Step 1.2. Users inform the TTP to initiate an exchange
attempt at TEX:
UA ! TTP : fL;A;B;TEX; fVA;Ag; fVB;Bg; rttABg;
UB ! TTP : fL;A;B;TEX; fVA;Ag; fVB;Bg; rttBAg:
The last field rttXY is UX’s estimation of the round trip
time between its node and NY. Upon receiving the messages
sent in Step 1.2, the TTP verifies whether all fields except
the last one are identical, L refers to an exchange between A
and B, and TEX is future and also “sufficiently” ahead of
TR. (The minimum expected value for (TR  TEX) varies
with the protocols.)
If the verifications are affirmative, the TTP generates a
nonce N for the exchange attempt. It then sends A to NA
and B to NB which include the parameters L and H(N).
The nature and the complete contents of s sent by the TTP
will vary with the combination of chosen assumptions and
will be described as a part of the protocol descriptions.
2.5.3 TTP Involvement
A protocol is said to keep the TTP offline [4] if it is possible
for honest user processes to achieve normal termination
without interacting with the TTP after an exchange attempt
has been initiated. Such a protocol is also called optimistic in
the literature (e.g., [2]). If the TTP is not offline, it is said to
be online.
We will say that a protocol uses a state-relinquishing TTP
if it allows the users to specify some finite value for (the
relinquish time) TR in the start-up phase (Step 0.1). As in
[17], a protocol is said to use a state-keeping TTP if it does not
allow a finite value to be specified for TR in the start-up
phase; it may require the TTP to respond to messages from
user processes for an unspecified amount of time and,
hence, TR is expected to be set to 1 in Step 0.1. From the
cost point of view, the TTP is preferred to be offline and
state-relinquishing.
2.5.4 Protocol Naming Notations
Before presenting the protocol family, the following con-
ventions are used for denoting each protocol. PR is the short
form for protocol which, by default, is non-fault-tolerant;
CT is indicative of a crash-tolerant protocol. The assump-
tions regarding abuse model () and communication model
() are indicated by the first and the second suffix after PR,
respectively, i.e., as PR  or CT .
.  ¼ R or  ¼ M indicates that the abuse is restricted
or malicious, respectively.
.  ¼ S or  ¼ A means that the communication is
synchronous or asynchronous, respectively.
For example, PR_RS denotes a non-fault-tolerant proto-
col for restricted abuser and synchronous communication,
and CT_MA a crash-tolerant protocol for malicious abuser
and asynchronous communication. When there are several
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protocols for a given set of assumptions, they are numbered
as PR  #1, PR  #2, and so on.
3 NON-FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS
3.1 Protocol (PR_RS) for Restricted Abuser and
Synchronous Communication
The TTP sends code A to PA and B to PB. PA and PB
perform the exchange phase of the protocol PR RS by
executing the code given to them. Embedded in X are L,
H(N), VX, , and keys KA and KB, each with the TTP’s
evidence of origin.  is set to D (the known bound on
message delays—see Section 2.2). KA and KB are symmetric
and random session keys. Recall that, when a dishonest UX
is only a restricted abuser, he cannot obtain KA and KB from
X nor undetectably modify VX embedded within X.
However, UX can delay, block, inspect, or tamper with any
message PX generates or is destined to receive while it
executes X.
The message exchange between PA and PB are depicted
in Fig. 2, where a message shown along an outgoing arrow
is sent only on the condition that every incoming message
shown has been received. More precisely, PX starts the
rounds only after receiving X (from the TTP) and a valid
IX (from UX); it sends MX (in round 1) and sends AckXðYÞ
(in round 2) if MY is additionally received.
Table 1 summarizes the messages sent, together with
their destinations. A message is indicated by its significant
fields, with the first three fields being the label L, the
sender, and H(N). The detailed description of the protocol
for PA is presented below and that for PB can be obtained
by symmetry.
On receiving A, PA sets a timeout for 2 and verifies
whether IA (input by UA) passes VA embedded within A. If
IA does not pass the verification, PA halts the execution. If IA
is verified to be valid, PA encrypts IA using KA and the
encrypted item is denoted as A. It then forms a message
MA whose contents include A and are encrypted with KB.
(See rows 1 and 2 of Table 1.)MA is sent to PB. Similarly,MB
is sent by PB to PA.
If PA receives MB before the timeout (of 2) expires, it
decrypts the received MB using KB and then decrypts the
contained B with KB to obtain IB. Recall that PA is in
possession of VB (see Step 1.1) and can therefore verify
whether IB satisfies VB. If IB is found valid, PA sends an
acknowledgment AckAðBÞ to PB and waits to receive
AckBðAÞ from PB before the timeout expires. Note that PA
receivingMB does not lead to resetting of the timeout; it sets
the timeout only once and completes both the rounds when
or before that timeout expires.
When PA completes both the rounds, it is in one of the
four following states: SAð1; 1Þ, where it has received both
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Fig. 2. Protocol PR_RS: Message exchange rounds between user processes.
TABLE 1
Description of Messages Used in the Exchange Phase of Protocol PR_RS
MB and AckBðAÞ; SAð0; 0Þ, where it has received neither;
SAð1; 0Þ, where it has receivedMB not AckBðAÞ; and SAð0; 1Þ,
where it has received only AckBðAÞ. If PA is in state SAð1; 1Þ,
it computes IB fromMB—which is feasible as it has both the
keys KA and KB. If it is in SAð1; 0Þ, it asks the TTP to resolve
the exchange by sending message ResA that contains both
MA and MB. (See row 4 of Table 1.) If the state is SAð0; 1Þ or
SAð0; 0Þ, PA requests the TTP to abort the exchange by
sending message ReqA that contains MA. (See also row 5 of
Table 1.)
TR specified in Step 0.1 can be finite and the TTP initiates
the exchange at its clock time TEX only if TR  TEX > 4. If
the exchange has been initiated at TEX, the TTP initializes
the variable outcome = unknown and executes the following
three steps at TEX þ 4.
Step T1. If the TTP has received Req from both PA and
PB or Res from at least one process, it sets outcome = resolved
and resolves the exchange by sending to both the processes
a messageMTTPðXÞwhose contents can be seen in the row 6
of Table 1.
Step T2. If the TTP has received Req from only one
process, it sets outcome = aborted and aborts the exchange:
An abort token AbortTTPðXÞ is sent to both PA and PB.
Row 7 of Table 1 shows the contents of AbortTTPðXÞ.
Step T3. The TTP terminates the execution for this
exchange attempt.
An honest PA terminates normally by receiving either
MB and AckBðAÞ or MTTPðAÞ; exceptionally by receiving
AbortTTPðAÞ. The reader is referred to Appendix A1 of [11],
which uses the following observations to show that the four
properties of fair-exchange are met:
. A dishonest user, say UB, is a restricted abuser. He
therefore cannot obtain KA or KB from B. Also, he
cannot deceive PB into accepting an IB for which
VBðIBÞ is not true nor can he force PB to deliver IA
against the protocol conditions.
. An honest PA sends AckAðBÞ to PB only if it receives
MB in a timely manner. So, if UB obtains IA, then PA
must be able to send the request ResA (containing
MB) to the TTP.
. Since PA completes both the rounds on a timeout of
2, the TTP will receive any message from PA before
TEX þ 4 as per its clock. The TTP’s response is
identical to both PX.
Remarks. Postexchange Allegations. When PX terminates
normally, the IY which UX receives must meet Y
advertised by UY. This is because if UY is dishonest, he
cannot deceive PY into accepting an IY for which VYðIYÞ
is not true. So, if a user alleges that the item he received
does not conform to the advertised specification, the
allegation is unfounded and warrants no investigation
from the protocol’s perspective.
Distinct Keys. Observe that the TTP supplies the key pair,
KA and KB, to both PA and PB. A dishonest user cannot
deduce any of the keys from the TTP-supplied code X. So,
there is no reason why these keys need to be distinct, and a
single key, K  KA  KB, can be used in their place: Both
PA and PB use K to generate X and encryptMX (see rows 1
and 2 of Table 1). We used distinct keys only to simplify the
derivation of other protocols from PR_RS.
3.2 Malicious Abuser, Synchronous
Communication (PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2)
Derived from PR_RS are two protocols, denoted as
PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2. In PR_MS_#1, UX may receive
an item that does not conform to the specification Y
advertised by UY. Consequently, following a “normal”
termination, UX may need to contact the TTP to resolve a
dispute. The TTP restores fairness to an honest user by
contacting only the trusted authorities TAA and TAB;
specifically, it requires no cooperation from the other user.
PR_MS_#2, on the other hand, leaves no room for
postexchange disputes to arise.
3.2.1 Protocol PR_MS_#1 (With Postexchange Dispute
Resolution)
The time taken to resolve a dispute is assumed to be
bounded by a known constant DR. Since the communica-
tion model is synchronous, such an assumption is justified
provided that dispute resolution terminates, i.e., does not
involve dishonest users or crash-prone nodes.
The TTP initiates an exchange only ifTEXþ6þDR<TR.
The exchange phase of PR_MS_#1 is derived from PR_RS,
accounting for the fact that a dishonest user, say UB, can
now obtain the keys KA and KB from B supplied by the
TTP. The following four changes are needed in the contents
of messages used, and Table 2 presents the full list of the
messages:
1. A is a message containing all parameters as in
PR_RS except VA and KB: A ¼ ðL;HðNÞ;;KAÞ;
similarly, B ¼ ðL;HðNÞ;;KBÞ. Further, the TTP
should not have used KA and KB before.
2. Since A does not contain KB;MA is no longer
encrypted withKB as in PR_RS (see row 2 of Table 1).
The plain contents ofMA andMB are shown in row 2
of Table 2.
3. PA includes KA in AckAðBÞ (in place of My_ack) so
that, if PB has bothMB and AckAðBÞ, it can terminate
normally without having to contact the TTP. Row 3
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TABLE 2
Description of Messages Used in
the Exchange Phase of Protocol PR_MS_#1
of Table 2 shows the modified contents of AckAðBÞ
and AckBðAÞ.
4. Finally, MTTPðAÞ, by which the TTP instructs PA to
resolve the exchange, now has KB (again in place of
My_ack). Row 6 of Table 2 shows the contents of
MTTPðXÞ.
Correctness. Regarding termination, the arguments for
PR_RS hold only if both the users are honest. If UB is
dishonest and if PA terminates “normally,” UA might find
the item it received not passing the verification test VB
which it agreed upon with UB in the start-up phase.
Consider the following scenario: Malicious UB obtains KB
from B, generates M
0
B using I
0
B 6¼ IB, and transmits M0B in
place of MB. Say, M
0
B is received with authentic evidence of
origin. So, PA accepts the received M
0
B. Since A does not
contain KB (see modification 1 above), PA cannot check
whether the I0B in the receivedM
0
B meets VB at the end of the
first round itself (see Fig. 2). Since PA accepts M
0
B, it will
send AckAðBÞ that contains KA, thus letting PB terminate
normally without ever contacting the TTP. Only after being
delivered of I0B, can UA find out that I
0
B does not pass VB and
that UB has been dishonest. Note that, if UB is a restricted
abuser, the above scenario cannot arise, as UB cannot obtain
KB from B.
In summary, the exchange phase of PR_MS_#1 only
guarantees that PA delivers to an honest UA what a
dishonest UB actually sent in exchange for IA, not necessarily
what UB has pledged to send. If the former is different from
the latter, the TTP restores fairness to UA by obtaining IB
from the trusted agent TAB who UB employed to generate
VB. This arrangement corresponds to a weaker form of
fairness enforcement in the hierarchy of [23]: Fairness is
guaranteed with the help of a trusted authority and without
any cooperation from UB.
Dispute Resolution. When PX delivers I to UX, UX
verifies whether VYðIÞ is true; if VYðIÞ is not true, then UX
sends a dispute resolution call to the TTP with the evidence
that PY sent MY containing the disputed I. The TTP
responds to a dispute resolution call from UX by verifying
the evidence supplied, contacting TAY to obtain IY, and
forwarding IY to UX. The step T3 of Section 3.1 is modified
as below:
Step T3. The TTP terminates execution at TEX þ 6, only
if no call for dispute resolution is received. If a call is
received, it initiates the procedure for dispute resolution.
The arguments for nontriviality remain the same as for
PR_RS since they concern only when both users are honest.
Since dispute resolution restores fairness, the definition of
normal termination (in Section 2.4) can be weakened to one
of UX receiving an item that either conforms to or can be
made to conform to the advertised Y. This means that the
arguments of PR_RS for fairness also hold here; the
arguments for nonrepudiation are also the same as for
PR_RS, except that the evidence of origin for KB may come
from PB (in AckBðAÞ) as well.
3.2.2 Protocol PR_MS_#2 (No Postexchange Dispute)
The core idea behind eliminating the need to handle any
postexchange dispute is to enable PX to verify an encrypted
item without decrypting it. We achieve this, as in the
protocols of [18] and [19], by making use of inverse and
compatible keys and modifying PR_RS appropriately. The
modification is simple and preserves the 2-round structure.
The protocol of [19] keeps the TTP online and that of [18],
like PR_MS_#2, keeps the TTP offline but requires four
rounds when both the users are honest.
Inverse and Compatible Keys. The inverse key pair
fK;K1g has this property: For any m,
eK1ðeKðmÞÞ ¼ eKðeK1ðmÞÞ ¼ m:
If keys K1 and K2 are compatible, then a product key
K1 K2 can be obtained with the following properties:
1. There exist two large numbers N1 and N2 such that:
eK1K2ðmÞeK1ðÞ mod N1 if and only if m¼ and
eK1 K2ðmÞ  eK2ðÞ mod N2 if and only if m ¼ .
2. m can be obtained from eK1 K2ðmÞ using K11 or
K12 if N1 and N2 are known.
As in [19], N1 and N2 are assumed to be publicly known.
We refer the reader to [19] for a detailed treatment on
inverse and compatible keys. Below, we state the modifica-
tions on PR_RS to derive PR_MS_#2.
Step 0.1. In this step, UA and UB additionally (see also
Section 2.5.2) obtain keys K0A and K0B, respectively, from
the TTP which escrows the inverse keys K10A and K
1
0B .
Step 0.2. UA approaches its TAA also with K0A; TAA
computes VA ¼ eK0AðIAÞ and returns its response as in
Section 2.5.2; similarly, TAB computes VB ¼ eK0BðIBÞ.
The modifications on PR_RS for PA are as follows, and
those for PB can be derived by substituting the subscripts A
and B by B and A, respectively.
. PA does not receive KA from the TTP, but generates
it to be compatible with K0A.
. A ¼ eK0A KAðIAÞ. MA ¼ ðL;A;HðNÞ;AÞ. ( See
rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.)
. By the properties of compatible keys, PA verifies if
B (contained in MB) and VB (obtained in the set-up
phase) are encryptions of the same data item. If so, it
sends AckAðBÞ after including K1A in place of
My_ack—see row 3 in Table 3.
. As soon as PA computes IB after receiving both MB
and AckBðAÞ, it verifies whether IB satisfies B. If PB
has not included the correct K1B in its AckBðAÞ, IB
will not satisfy B. In that case, PA assumes that it
did not receive AckBðAÞ and, as in PR_RS, it sends
ResA to the TTP.
. The TTP includes K10B in place of My_ack in its
MTTPðAÞ. (See row 4 of Table 3.)
3.3 Restricted and Malicious Abusers,
Asynchronous Communication
(PR_RA and PR_MA)
PR_RS, PR_MS_#1, and PR_MS_#2 use an offline and state-
relinquishing TTP. As per [17], the nature of the TTP makes
them inappropriate for the asynchronous model for the
following reasons (see also Section 6). In an exchange
attempt, an offline TTP may or may not receive an abort/
resolve request from user(s); it will receive no request if
users manage to have normal termination without contact-
ing it. When the communication is asynchronous, the TTP
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cannot know how long a user request, if there is one, will
take to arrive. So, the TTP needs to keep the states until it
has received a request or it has known that there is no
request from the users. The latter is possible only if each
user informs the TTP of its normal termination. Since a
dishonest user need not inform the TTP and an honest
user’s message can take an arbitrary amount of time, a finite
value for TR cannot be guaranteed in the start-up phase.
A (contract-signing) protocol with an offline and state-
keeping TTP is presented in [17]. We here derive PR_RA and
PR_MA_#2 with an online and state-relinquishing TTP and
PR_MA_#1 with an online and state-keeping TTP. The
derivation is from their respective synchronous counter-
parts and involves the following three modifications:
. In Step 1.2, the TTP obtains round trip time (rtt)
measurements from each PX (as rttA and rttB) and
estimates
2 ¼ maximumf2; rttA; rttB; rttAB; rttBAg:
(Note that  is included in the X sent by the TTP to
signal the start of the exchange phase.)
. Round 1 of the exchange phase remains the same; in
round 2 (see Fig. 2), PX sends AckXðYÞ to the TTP,
not to PY, if it is satisfied with the round 1 message it
received; it then waits for either MTTPðXÞ or
AbortTTPðXÞ from the TTP.
. TR ¼ 1 only for PR_MA_#1 as it is not possible to
estimate the bound DR.
The TTP’s code for the exchange phase is presented in
Fig. 3. Note that the TTP resolves the exchange only if both
the processes are satisfied with what they received in the
first round; also, AckXðYÞ acts as a signal to the TTP that PX
is satisfied with the round-1 message it received. MTTPðXÞ
contains appropriate information needed for processes to
decrypt the round-1 message. This information is “My_ack,”
KY, and K
1
0Y for PR_RA, PR_MA_#1, and PR_MA_#2,
respectively—exactly as in PR_RS, PR_MS_#1, and
PR_MS_#2, respectively. The contents of MTTPðXÞ are
shown below for each protocol. (The messages ResA,
ReqA, ResB, and ReqB of the synchronous protocols are
not needed.)
MTTPðAÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMBÞ;My ackÞ;
TTP! PA ==PR RA
MTTPðAÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMBÞ;KBÞ;
TTP! PA ==PR MA #1
MTTPðAÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMBÞ;K10BÞ;
TTP! PA ==PR MA #2
MTTPðBÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMAÞ;My ackÞ;
TTP! PB ==PR RA
MTTPðBÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMAÞ;KAÞ;
TTP! PB ==PR MA #1
MTTPðBÞ ¼ ðL;TTP;HðNÞ;HðMAÞ;K10AÞ;
TTP! PB ==PR MA #2:
Correctness. The properties of termination, fairness, and
nonrepudiation are met for the reasons that 1) PX terminates
only by receiving a message from the TTP and the contents
of the TTP’s message alone decide the type of termination
and 2) the TTP in PR_MA_#1 is state-keeping (TR ¼ 1) and
can therefore restore fairness whenever it is approached by
an honest PX for a postexchange dispute resolution. If
honest users reexecute the protocol after every exceptional
termination, nontriviality is guaranteed if there exists an
execution in which the message transfer delays between PA,
PB, and the TTP do not exceed the determined by the TTP
at the start of the exchange phase; i.e., if message transfer
delays do not increase during an execution.
280 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 2, NO. 4, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2005
TABLE 3
Messages of Protocol PR_RS which Get Modified for Protocol PR_MS_#2
Fig. 3. Pseudocode for the TTP in PR_RA, PR_MA_#1, and PR_MA_#2.
4 CRASH-TOLERANT FAIR EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
4.1 Restricted Abuser and Synchronous
Communication (CT_RS)
We make PR_RS crash-tolerant by incorporating three
features: 1) state-keeping TTP, 2) check-pointing by protocol
processes, and 3) an additional round in the exchange phase.
State-keeping TTP: In Step 0.1, TR is set to 1. The TTP
executes steps T1 and T2 of Section 3.1 at TEX þ 4, except
that it does not respond to PX that has sent no message to it.
In Step T3, it does not terminate, but waits to respond to a
message from PX. The response to PX is either an abort or a
resolve message. (The latter is denoted as Ack2TTPðXÞ, not
as MTTPðXÞ.) Thus, the TTP always helps a recovered PX
to terminate. Appendix 2 of [11] presents the TTP’s code
in detail.
Pessimistic (synchronous) check-pointing: PX of an honest
user logs every received message and check-points its state
before the received message is processed. Thus, in Fig. 2, an
honest PX receives and logs the messages of the incoming
channels before it sends out a message.
Even with check-pointing by PX and state-keeping by
TTP, PR_RS is not crash-tolerant. Consider the following
scenario. Let NA crash after AckAðBÞ is sent but before
AckBðAÞ is received (see Fig. 2). PA must have logged IA,
A, and MB and check-pointed the sending of MA, prior
to processing the received MB. Let dishonest UB block all
messages PA sent to PB, but retain a copy of them. PB,
having received no message from PA within 2 time,
sends ReqB for which the TTP will respond by setting
outcome = aborted and sending AbortTTPðBÞ. Say UB blocks
AbortTTPðBÞ as well and crashes NB. Say, PA recovers
meanwhile. Having received only MB, PA will send ResA,
but the TTP’s response to PA will be to send
AbortTTPðAÞ. Let UB reboot NB and adjust the clock to
make it appear as if B has just been received. He
replays the arrival of the blocked messages from PA
exactly at those instances when they arrived during the
first execution. Since PB “receives” both MA and AckAðBÞ,
it delivers IA to UB.
4.1.1 Outline of Protocol CT_RS—Incorporating the
Third Round
To make PR_RS crash-tolerant, we additionally need to
make two provisions: 1) When PB has MA and AckAðBÞ,
it can deliver IA to UB without consulting the TTP only if
it knows that PA also has MB and AckBðAÞ and 2) even
after the TTP has aborted the exchange for PB, it can
resolve the exchange for PA if PA “appeals” with valid
credentials. A third round (shown in Fig. 4) is added to
implement 1) and 2).
PX check-points its state soon after it completes the first
two rounds. Only if it has received both MY and AckYðXÞ
does it enters the third round by sending a second
acknowledgement Ack2XðYÞ to PY. (Otherwise, it acts as in
PR_RS.) Once PX enters the third round, it expects to
receive Ack2YðXÞ from PY within 2 time. If Ack2YðXÞ is not
received until the timeout expires, PX appeals to the TTP by
sending First AcksX that contains both AckXðYÞ and
AckYðXÞ.
When the TTP receives First AcksA, it sends a resolve
message Ack2TTPðAÞ to PA only if it had not earlier sent
AbortTTPðAÞ to PA. (The decision to send Ack2TTPðAÞ to PA
is not influenced by whether or not AbortTTPðBÞ had been
earlier sent to PB.) The condition for PA to terminate
normally is receivedðAck2ZAðAÞÞ where ZA 2 fB;TTPg; that
for PB is receivedðAck2ZBðBÞÞ, ZB 2 fA;TTPg. The pseudo-
code and the correctness arguments can be seen in
Appendix A2 of [11]. Table 4 shows the three messages
used in addition to those used in PR_RS.
4.2 Malicious Abuser, Synchronous
Communication (CT_MS_#1 and CT_MS_#2)
Protocols CT_MS_#1 and CT_MS_#2 are obtained from
PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2, respectively, by adding the third
round in the same manner employed for obtaining CT_RS
from PR_RS. The contents of a few messages need to be
changed and these changes arise due to the following
reason: Recall that AckXðYÞ sent in the second round (also
the final round) of PR_MS_#1 and PR_MS_#2 contains keys
for decrypting the messages received in the earlier round.
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Fig. 4. Additional message round for CT_RS.
TABLE 4
Additional Messages of CT_RS
These keys must now be exchanged in the third round, and
the AckXðYÞ is sent containing no keys. Also, Ack2TTPðXÞ
will now include the key that was contained in MTTPðXÞ as
the latter is not used in the crash-tolerant versions. These
changes are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.
4.3 Malicious and Restricted Abusers,
Asynchronous Communication, Online TTP
(CT_RA, CT_MA_#1, and CT_MA_#2)
These protocols are obtained by making PR_RA,
PR_MA_#1, and PR_MA_#2 crash-tolerant. This is done
by 1) having process PX pessimistically checkpoint its state
before processing a received message and 2) making the
TTP state-keeping. The latter is done as follows: For any
message received from PX after TEX þ 4, the TTP sends
MTTPðXÞ to PX if both AckAðBÞ and AckBðAÞ have been
received before TEX þ 4; otherwise, it sends AbortTTPðXÞ.
Checkpointing permits a recovered PX to resume execution
correctly and the state-keeping by the TTP allows the
recovery time to be arbitrary. Note that the third round is
not needed because PX can terminate only by receiving a
message from the (online) TTP.
4.4 Summary and Extensions
PR_RS is the basic protocol from which we derive every
other protocol. Its TTP is offline and state-relinquishing.
The restricted abuse assumption was relaxed in two
ways: by adding postexchange resolution procedures
(PR_MS_#1) and by the use of compatible and inverse
keys (PR_MS_#2). From this core subfamily of triplets,
many other triplets are derived as shown in Fig. 4,
where a circle represents a protocol-triplet for both the
abuse models (? ¼ ). Note that the bound DR on
dispute resolution delays must be known for the TTP to
be state-relinquishing; otherwise, TR needs to be 1, i.e.,
the TTP be state-keeping. (See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.)
The triplet PR_*S is enhanced in Section 3.3 to PR_*A by
making the TTP online and estimating freshly before each
exchange initiation to ensure nontriviality. (The protocol-
triplets with online TTP are indicated by thick circles in
Fig. 5.) Retaining offline TTP, PR_*S are enhanced to CT_*S
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. It required adding three features:
state-keeping TTP (SK), PX to checkpoint its state (CP), and
a third round (3R). In Section 4.3, the PR_*A (with online
TTP) are transformed to CT_*A by adding just SK and CP.
Note that adding 3R is not needed when the TTP is online
and solely dictates how PX should terminate.
The dotted arrows in Fig. 5 represent derivations not
described in the earlier sections. Consider first the protocols
with offline TTP (shown in the upper half of Fig. 5).
Deriving CT_*A from CT_*S is straightforward for the
following reason: A recovered node resuming the protocol
execution after an arbitrary amount of repair-time appears
to its environment as a reliable node whose response is
arbitrarily delayed. So, CT_*S will cope with network
asynchrony so long as  is estimated freshly before each
exchange initiation to ensure nontriviality. Reduction of
CT_*A to PR_*A removes check-pointing (CP) since nodes
do not crash. For protocols with online TTP, reducing
CT_*A to CT_*S and PR_*A to PR_*S would mean that the
fresh evaluation of  is not necessary as the bound D on
message delays is known in the synchronous model.
Further, the bound DR can also be known. So, the
postexchange dispute resolution no longer requires the
TTP to be state-keeping in PR_*S since nodes do not crash.
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TABLE 5
Additions to and Changes in the Messages of PR_MS_#1 for Deriving CT_MS_#1
TABLE 6
Additions to and Changes in the Messages of PR_MS_#2 for Deriving CT_MS_#2
5 RESTRICTING ABUSE
Our restricted abuser model requires that a dishonest user
be prevented from extracting encryption keys (KA and KB)
and from modifying verification procedure (VA or VB)
which are embedded in the code (A or B) supplied by the
TTP. In this section, we show how the model of malicious
abuser can be reduced to one of restricted abuser. We make
use of smartcard technology and also a smartcard-based
protocol of Shoup and Rubin [20] designed for secure
generation of session keys for distributed processes. The
latter has been proven correct in [5], [20] and its
implementation can be seen in [15]. (For an easy under-
standing of the protocol, we refer the reader to a
deconstructed version in [5].) Our attempt at restricting
abuse involves a small modification on the use of the
original Shoup and Rubin protocol, but preserves the
smartcard to be a stateless probabilistic device.
Fig. 6 depicts the Smartcard-based Fair-Exchange sys-
tem. Each node NX is attached to a smartcard device to
interact with the smartcard CX of user UX. We assume, as in
[20], that CX has a hardwired, long-term key K1X stored in it
and is shared only with the TTP; UX is assumed not to be
able to guess this key stored in his own card. We also
assume that the smartcard devices are tamper-resistant and
do not crash. Finally, the communication between PX and
the local smartcard device is assumed reliable (i.e., what is
sent is received uncorrupted) and synchronous.
The principles behind abuse restriction are two-fold.
Shoup and Rubin protocol assumes the availability of a TTP
which, upon being requested by one of the users, initiates
an execution of the protocol. At the end of the execution, the
user processes (PA and PB in our case) obtain a shared
symmetric key (say, K) from their local smartcard CX. In
our system, a dishonest user UX could control PX. So, CX
returns to PX the K encrypted with its hard-wired long-
term key K1X. (This is the only modification on the use of
Shoup and Rubin protocol.) The shared K encrypted with
K1X is denoted as K2X. Note that the TTP knows K1X for
X ¼ A or B and, hence, it can know K, given K2X. Thus, the
TTP, CA, and CB together form the logical TTP for PR_RS
and CT_RS in the following sense. The TTP and CX enable
PX toward using a key K that can also be used by PY. UX
cannot deduce K since PX receives and stores K only in the
encrypted form—encrypted with K1X that UX cannot access.
Second, the supplied K is used in place of KA and KB.
(See also the remark Distinct Keys in Section 3.1.) Since PA
and PB do not know K, they cannot perform the protocol-
specific cryptographic operations, such as forming X, by
themselves. So, they have such operations done for them by
the local CX. To this end, CX supports three APIs.
Moreover, to preserve CX to be a stateless device, these
APIs are invoked by PX with all relevant information so
that CX does not have to store any protocol specific
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Fig. 5. Protocol derivation methods.
Fig. 6. Smartcard-based fair-exchange system.
information (including the K it generated). The three APIs
are verify_local(), verify_remote(), and decrypt(). They enable
PA 1) to have IA verified, 2) to have MA constructed, and 3)
to verify and decrypt MB, respectively. They are described
below.
5.1 Modifications and Additional Support
Recall that in protocols PR_RS and CT_RS, the TTP sends
A to PA which contains: L, H(N), VA,, KA, and KB. In the
smartcard-based system, L, H(N), and  remain the same;
instead of VA, V1A ¼ eK1AðL;HðNÞ;UA;VAÞ is sent, and the
information SRA necessary for PA to execute Shoup-Rubin
protocol is sent in place of KA and KB. Thus, A ¼
ðL;HðNÞ;V1A;; SRAÞ and B ¼ ðL;HðNÞ;V1B;; SRBÞ. PA
and PB execute the protocol which results in PA receiving
K2A from CA and PB receiving K2B from CB, if processes
execute the protocol properly and do not prematurely time
out on each other.
verify_local():
PA ! CA : ðK2A;V1A; IAÞ;
/* note: V1A ¼ eK1AðL;HðNÞ;UA;VAÞ.
CA ! PA : MA ¼ eKðL;HðNÞ;UA;VA; IAÞ
if VAðIAÞ, or nackA otherwise;
Using its hard-wired key K1A, CA decrypts the first and
the second input parameters to obtain K and
ðL;HðNÞ;UA;VAÞ, respectively. If the third input parameter
(IA) passes VA, then CA constructs MA with the contents
encrypted with K and returns MA. The contents of MA are
those obtained in the decryption of the second input
parameter (V1A) and the verified IA.
verify_remote():
PA ! CA : ðK2A;MBÞ;
CA ! PA : ackA ¼ eKðL;HðNÞ;UB;OKÞ
if VBðIBÞ, or nackA otherwise;
CA obtains K from K2A; using K, it decrypts MB to
ðL;HðNÞ;UB;VB; IBÞ. If IA passes VA, CA returns ackA.
If PA receives ackA, it sends AckAðBÞ to PB in protocol
PR_RS with ackA in place of My ack (see row 3, Table 1); in
protocol CT_RS, AckAðBÞ sent will be as in Table 1 and ackA
will replace My ack2 in Ack2AðBÞ (see row 1, Table 4). If, on
the other hand, PA receives nackA, it assumes that it did not
receive MB and acts as per the protocol—i.e., sends ReqA to
the TTP. The messages ResA, ReqA, and First AcksA will
additionally include K2A as shown in Table 7.
If the TTP decides to resolve the exchange after the due
verification process, it computes ackTTPðAÞ for PA which is
the same as ackB ¼ eKðL;HðNÞ;UA; OKÞ; similarly,
ackTTPðBÞ for PB is the same as
ackA ¼ eKðL;HðNÞ;UB; OKÞ:
It uses ackTTPðXÞ in place of My ack in MTTPðXÞ for PR_RS
(see row 6, Table 1); for CT_RS, it uses ackTTPðXÞ in place of
My ack2 in Ack2TTPðXÞ (see row 3 of Table 4). The resulting
contents of MTTPðXÞ and Ack2TTPðXÞ are shown in rows 4
and 5 of Table 7, respectively. (Recall that MTTPðXÞ is not
used in CT_RS.)
decrypt():
PA ! CA : ðK2A;V1A;MB; ackBÞ or
ðK2A;V1A;MB; ackTTPðAÞÞ; CA ! PA : IB;
In the decrypt() operation, CA checks 1) if the first three
fields fL;HðNÞ;UAg of V1A, and of ackB or ackTTPðAÞ are
identical, and 2) if the first two fields fL;HðNÞg of MB and
of ackB or ackTTPðAÞ are identical. If 1) and 2) are verified to
be true, CA decrypts MB and returns IB.
6 RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, this paper and [10] are the
only ones that consider the restricted abuser model in
solving the fair-exchange problem and also to show how
smartcards can be used to realise that model. The
smartcards and the related protocols essentially build a
trusted computing base (TCB) within an untrustworthy host.
Such an abstraction is assumed in [3] to solve a multiparty,
fair-exchange problem for the synchronous communication
model. The smartcards are stateless probabilistic devices,
and are retained so, while we use them to realize our
restricted abuse model. Vogt et al., on the other hand,
develop a two-party, fair-exchange protocol [24] using
smartcards as state-keeping, trusted computing platforms.
For example, a smartcard should be able to construct signed
messages describing its state and be able to authenticate the
signed messages it receives, say, from a Bank.
6.1 Incorporating Crash Tolerance
The paper by Liu et al. [16] is the first and perhaps the
only other work we know of to undertake the task of
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TABLE 7
Description of Messages Used When Abuse Is Restricted by Smartcards
transforming nonfault-tolerant protocols into crash-toler-
ant ones. The authors propose a semantics-based message
logging scheme which optimizes the number of messages
that need to be pessimistically (synchronously) logged.
The proposed approach is claimed to work for both
online and offline TTP-based protocols. Moreover, their
approach is claimed to be orthogonal to the underlying
delay model (see Section 6.2 of [16]). To substantiate these
claims, the authors have considered a protocol with an
online and state-keeping TTP; this protocol is identical to
our PR_MA_#1 except that the communication model is
taken to be synchronous. The protocols we have devel-
oped here indicate that the issue of incorporating crash-
tolerance is far more subtle than the claims of [16] and is
governed by a combination of several factors. Referring to
Fig. 5, the following can be observed when a non-fault-
tolerant protocol is made crash-tolerant:
. When the TTP is online, it must be made state-
keeping (SK) if it is not already, in addition to CP.
This ensures that a recovering honest node can learn
the outcome of an exchange from the TTP and
terminate. Also, our protocol family shows that there
can be non-fault-tolerant protocols with a state-
relinquishing TTP, that is, there is no reason to
suppose that a non-fault-tolerant protocol will only
have a state-keeping TTP.
. If the TTP is offline, the protocol itself may have to be
modified. In Section 4.1.1, we have shown that adding
CP and SK alone is not sufficient for offline-TTP
protocols PR_*S to be made crash-tolerant; 3R is also
needed.
. Whether the TTP is online or offline, the delay model
does matter if nontriviality is to be guaranteed.
Asynchronous model requires the TTP to estimate 
freshly before an exchange initiation to cope with
increase in message transfer delays.
The semantics-based message logging scheme by [16]
operates as follows: It defines the point of no return for a user
process and, if the process would synchronously log all
received messages before entering this point, then logging
of other received messages can be done asynchronously.
The structure of CT_RS, however, indicates that a strategy
based on point of no return alone is not sufficient to make an
offline protocol crash-tolerant; it should involve process
check-pointing as well. In CT_RS, PX check-points its state
once it completes the first two rounds. (See Section 4.1.1.)
This check-pointing ensures that PX records what, if any,
was not received when the first two rounds ended and,
thereby, the postrecovery behavior is consistent with the
precrash behavior: If an action based on the nonarrival of an
expected message has been carried out in the precrash
execution, then the arrival of that message after recovery is
ignored. (The correctness arguments in [11] also highlight
the importance of check-pointing at this point during an
execution.)
There are no definitive arguments in [16] to assert that all
protocols will have only a single point of no return. If some
protocols can have multiple points at which pessimistic
logging or check-pointing is essential, then attempts to
minimize the overhead of logging may not be worth the
effort after all, given that the number of messages received
by a user process in a given execution is small.
6.2 Contract-Signing Protocols
The two-round structure of PR_RS of Section 3.1 is identical
to that of a contract-signing scheme (Scheme 2) of [17].
Similarly, Scheme 3 of [17] is identical in structure to
protocol PR_RA with the offline TTP which, as per Fig. 5,
can be derived from CT_RS (of Section 4.1) by adding a
fresh estimation of  prior to each exchange initiation, and
by removing check-pointing and message logging. In
contract-signing, two users compute a contract as a
nonrepudiable agreement over a preagreed contractual text
such that even if one user misbehaves either both or none
obtain a contract. The signing process is structured so that if
a user is deemed to misbehave after a certain point in the
execution, the TTP generates that user’s signature [14] or a
valid alternative [2]. Such countermeasures by the TTP are
simplified by the fact that the contractual text is known to
the users prior to the signing process, unlike the item IX,
which is a secret for UY prior to the exchange process.
Because of this difference, contract-signing is a weaker
version of the fair-exchange problem and can always be
solved (by default) through fair-exchange of signatures. For
this reason, the impossibility results on contract-signing
apply to fair-exchange; also, schemes 2 and 3 of [17] assume
malicious abuser, whereas PR_RS and PR_RA with the
offline TTP require that the abuser be restricted.
These structural similarities and the reasons provided
below suggest that any contract-signing protocol can lead to
a fair-exchange protocol being derived for the restricted
abuse model. In contract-signing, the messages that PA
sends to PB (until a certain point in the execution) are
useless to a dishonest UB because the received message
cannot by itself form a contract and the contractual text
within it is not a secret. Similarly, with the restricted abuse
assumption, the messages that PA receives from PB are
useless to UB (though they may contain IA): They are a
black-box to UB who cannot force PB to decrypt them
against the protocol conditions. Further, the signatures
generated by the TTP as a countermeasure in contract-
signing have their equivalence in the TTP sending a resolve
message ðMTTPðXÞ or Ack2TTPðXÞÞ and thereby having PX
decrypt Y and deliver IY to UX.
We believe that the rich variety of contract-signing
protocols in the literature and their analyses (e.g., [8]) can
help derive new families of fair-exchange protocols and a
deeper understanding of them. For example, Scheme 1 of
[17], [14], and [2] present asymmetric protocols which assign
nonidentical roles to each user, whereas all the protocols in
the family developed here are symmetric.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper comprehensively investigated the problem of
TTP-based, two-party, fair-exchange by considering three
significant factors that influence the solution space. The first
factor is concerned with a dishonest user’s ability to
interfere with the protocol execution. In the restricted
abuser model, a dishonest user cannot obtain the keys
embedded in the code supplied by the TTP and also cannot
force the protocol process to operate against the protocol
conditions. In the worst case, he can unintentionally, rather
than maliciously, block or delay the messages exchanged
and crash his node. Though the protocols for this model
have the same time and message complexity as the others,
they warrant no postexchange dispute resolution nor
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require sophisticated cryptographic keys, such as compa-
tible and inverse keys. We also describe a scheme by which
the restricted abuser model can be realized through the use
of smartcards and related protocols.
The other two factors concern the ability to estimate a
bound on communication delays between the parties and
the possibility of an honest user’s node crashing in the
middle of a protocol execution. The family of protocols
illustrates the impact of various assumptions that can be
made regarding these factors. For example, we identify that
the postexchange dispute resolution involving only the TTP
and the Trusted authorities can be eliminated in one of the
following two ways: reducing the malicious abuse model to
one of restricted abuse (using code obfuscation or smart-
card-based approach of Section 5) or using sophisticated
keys (as in PR_MS_#2). Also, it was observed that several
issues must be considered while transforming a non-fault-
tolerant protocol into a crash-tolerant one; particular
attention needs to be paid to the question of whether the
TTP of the non-fault-tolerant protocol is offline or online.
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